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DATE 10/24/85  
DOC NO FORM 85-10175  
OCR CYS 3  
P&PD CY 1

SECRET

21 October 1985

Background on Item III of 21 October NSC, Allied Consultation Meeting

1. The Economic Summit Allies will probably tell the President they want the meeting to be a genuine consultation and not a pro forma presentation of established US positions.

- They would be concerned if the US stonewalled on arms control and refused to discuss SDI at all during the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.
- They welcomed the Shultz San Francisco reassurances on the ABM treaty but remain suspicious about a lingering broad interpretation of the ABM treaty that makes possible a unilateral US decision to proceed with full scale testing and deployment of new systems.

2. The President might want to tell the group that:

- The Geneva meeting will deal with more than just arms control.
- Our understanding with the Europeans on SDI, spelled out in the Camp David accords and in the July USG factsheet, remains valid, that is, we will discuss with the Allies and the Soviets any steps that take us beyond research. At the same time we will refuse to give the Soviets a veto on our SDI programs.
- On arms control we will follow the approach spelled out by Ambassador Nitze in his NAC presentation, namely, to explore those parts of the Soviet counterproposal that offer some promise. If the Europeans press the issue, the President might ask them for specific suggestions. 25X1  
[redacted] diplomatic reporting so far does not indicate that any of the Europeans are prepared to make specific suggestions and they certainly will have no coordinated view).

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3. During her meeting, Thatcher may make the following points:

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-- The reaffirmation of the Camp David formula could make easier the rapid conclusion of a US-UK agreement on SDI research.

-- The absence of Mitterand from this Allied meeting further demonstrates the desirability of purchasing the UK tactical communications systems, a purchase which might also expedite agreement on SDI research.

-- She continues to oppose sanctions against South Africa and hopes the President will also remain firm.

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[REDACTED]

25X6

4. In his meeting, Kohl will be at pains to show that he has more influence with the President than any other leader. As part of his presentation he will probably:

-- Push harder than any other leader for a US counterproposal at Geneva.

[REDACTED]

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-- Reiterate the FRG intentions to enter into an agreement with the US on SDI research after the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting (the delay being largely to Genscher), but insist that West German firms must have access to relevant technologies and the leeway to exploit commercially new technologies they develop.

-- Argue the need for a chemical weapons treaty with the USSR. (West Germany is somewhat schizophrenic on this issue: it supports the US view that there should be a global verifiable treaty first

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